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Key Disclosing in Multiphotons with Quantum Cloning
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Multiphoton state in quantum cryptography decreases its security. Key disclosing with universal
quantum cloning machine (UQCM) is considered in explicit manner. Although UQCM cannot make
perfect clones, there is some invariant quantity between the original photon and the imperfect clones.
The invariant quantity, the direction of Stokes parameters, tells us the auxiliary information leading
into key information. The attack, then, corresponds to some kind of quantum non-demolition
measurement. Its application to recent high-performance quantum cryptography, Y-00 protocol, is
also studied.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography[1, 2] is expected to play an im-
portant role in near future information security. Because
its security is based on quantum mechanics instead of
computational complexity and is absolutely proved in re-
cent reports[3]-[5]. Quantum cryptography in real world
has, however, no perfect security, since it consists of im-
perfect devices[6]. Almost reports[7]-[11] on their exper-
iments use weak coherent pulse and its pulse includes a
little multiphoton. The multiphoton decreases its secu-
rity.
In this paper, we study how to disclose key infor-
mation in multiphoton using universal quantum cloning
machine(UQCM)[12, 13] in explicit manner. No-cloning
theorem[14], however, says that it is impossible to make
perfect clones from unknown quantum state and any
UQCM cannot make perfect clones. Imperfect clones
do not tell us the exact information. Our strategy con-
sists of three steps. The first step splits multiphoton into
two identical (multi-)photons. The second step amplifies
the split one to large number of imperfect clones with
UQCM and measures them for ‘auxiliary’ information to
be needed in the following correct observation. The third
step observes the other split one correctly with the aux-
iliary information and gets correct ‘parity’ information
which equals to key information generally. The auxiliary
information is, for example, a polarization base in the
polarization coding and corresponds to the direction of
Stokes parameters. The parity information, then, corre-
sponds to ‘up’ and ‘down.’ Key point of our attack is
that the imperfect clones with low fidelity keep the orig-
inal direction exactly, although their parity information
becomes obscure. Therefore we can measure accurately
the direction of the Stokes parameters with large number
of clones.
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Recently much higher performance quantum cryptog-
raphy named “Y-00 protocol[15]” with mesoscopic coher-
ent pulse is reported[16]-[19]. Its bit rate is 1,000-10,000
times higher than that of conventional quantum cryp-
tography because its pulse has 100-1,000 photons. The
proposers say that it has enough security by virtue of
quantum noise, although its pulse has multiphoton. Its
two key ingredients are multi-valued modulation related
to the auxiliary information and ‘ciphering wheel’ which
is a table of mapping from the parity and the auxiliary
information to the key information. The attacker, Eve,
knowing the correct parity information, gets wrong key
information, if her auxiliary information differs from the
correct one slightly. Disclosing the correct key informa-
tion needs the accurate auxiliary information. We, then,
apply our quantum amplification attack to Y-00 protocol.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We define qubit
and introduce its related quantities in Section II. Gisin
and Massar’s UQCM is introduced in Section III. Quan-
tum amplification attack is described in section IV. The
attack is applied to Y-00 protocol in section V. Finally
we discuss physical background of the quantum amplifi-
cation attack in section VI.
II. QUBIT
Qubit is generally defined by
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
|H〉+ sin θ
2
eiφ|V 〉, (1)
on some basis, where |H〉 is horizontal linear polarized
single photon state, |V 〉 is vertical linear polarized single
photon state, and 0 ≤ θ ≤ π, 0 ≤ φ < 2π. We focus on
photon state as qubit in this paper.
The photon state is represented as a point on Poincare´
sphere and is parameterized with Stokes parameters.
Stokes parameters are macroscopically defined by
S1 = PLH − PLV , (2)
S2 = PL+45 − PL−45, (3)
S3 = PRHC − PLHC , (4)
2where PLH , PLV , PL+45, PL−45, PRHC , and PLHC are
power of horizontal, vertical, +45 degree, -45 degree lin-
ear and right-handed, left-handed circular polarized com-
ponents of light. These definitions are microscopically
equivalent to
S1 = a
†
HaH − a†V aV , (5)
S2 = a
†
HaV + a
†
V aH , (6)
S3 = i(a
†
HaV − a†V aH), (7)
where aH and aV are annihilation operators of horizon-
tal and vertical linear polarized mode. These parame-
ters are, then, equivalent to angular momentum opera-
tors with the following commutation relations:
[Si, Sj] = −2iǫijkSk, (8)
where ǫijk is the totally antisymmetric Levi-Civita sym-
bol and ǫ123 = 1. The commutation relations, thus, pre-
vent all Stokes parameters from being measured simulta-
neously and exactly.
The photon state |ψ〉 has the following density matrix:
ρ = cos2
θ
2
|H〉〈H |+ cos θ
2
sin
θ
2
e−iφ|H〉〈V |
+cos
θ
2
sin
θ
2
eiφ|V 〉〈H |+ sin2 θ
2
|V 〉〈V |. (9)
The expectation value of Stokes parameters are, then,
calculated by
〈S1〉 = Tr[S1ρ] = cos θ, (10)
〈S2〉 = Tr[S2ρ] = sin θ cosφ, (11)
〈S3〉 = Tr[S3ρ] = sin θ sinφ, (12)
and their dispersions are given by
〈∆S21〉 = 〈S21〉 − 〈S1〉2 = 1− cos2 θ, (13)
〈∆S22〉 = 〈S22〉 − 〈S2〉2 = 1− sin2 θ cos2 φ, (14)
〈∆S22〉 = 〈S23〉 − 〈S3〉2 = 1− sin2 θ sin2 φ. (15)
Measuring Stokes parameters on single photon, therefore,
gains no sufficient large S/N ratio.
The parity information is defined by the sign of S2 and
the auxiliary information is defined by the quotient space
of (θ, φ) which has the following equivalent class:
(θ, φ) ≡ (π − θ, φ+ π). (16)
III. UNIVERSAL QUANTUM CLONING
MACHINE
The concept of universal quantum cloning machine
(UQCM) is introduced by Buzˇek and Hillery[13] although
No-cloning theorem prohibits perfect clones. UQCM,
then, makes imperfect clones and ‘universal’ means that
the quality of clone does not depend on an input state.
Buzˇek and Hillery’s UQCM making two clones of one
qubit is, however, insufficient for our attack[20] and we
use Gisin and Massar’s generalized UQCM[12] making
q-identical clones of p-identical qubits (q > p). Given
the p-identical input states |ψ〉, UQCM makes q-clones
in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1: Gisin and Massar’s UQCM
Their density matrix has the following form:
ρout = Fρ+Dρ⊥, (17)
where ρ⊥ is the density matrix of the orthogonal state of
|ψ〉 and F is fidelity and D is disturbance. The fidelity
and the disturbance satisfy the relation F +D = 1. The
orthogonal state with the following form:
|ψ⊥〉 = sin θ
2
|H〉 − cos θ
2
eiφ|V 〉, (18)
has the diametrical Stokes parameters
〈S⊥1〉 = − cos θ, (19)
〈S⊥2〉 = − sin θ cosφ, (20)
〈S⊥3〉 = − sin θ sinφ. (21)
Therefore the direction of Stokes parameters is invari-
ant in quantum cloning and its length is shrinking whose
factor is given by η = F − D in Fig. 2. The UQCM,
S1
S2
1
ρ
⊥ρ
0at =φ
θ
outρ
+
-
FIG. 2: Clone State
then, decreases the parity information but conserves the
auxiliary information.
3Gisin and Massar give the following fidelity[12]:
F =
q(p+ 1) + p
q(p+ 2)
. (22)
The result includes Buzˇek and Hillery’s result at p = 1
and q = 2. We, then, get the following disturbance:
D =
q − p
q(p+ 2)
, (23)
and the shrinking factor is given by
η =
p(q + 2)
q(p+ 2)
. (24)
IV. QUANTUM AMPLIFICATION ATTACK
We assume the targeted multiphoton can be divided
into two (multi-) photons. The attack consists of two
phases; the first one is measurement for the auxiliary
information using the divided (multi-) photon and the
second one is observation for the parity information us-
ing the other divided (multi-) photon. The first phase is
divided into two steps; Step 1 is quantum amplification
of the former (multi-) photon and Step 2 is measurement
of the quantum amplified photons for the auxiliary infor-
mation. The whole attack, then, consists of three steps
in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3: Quantum Amplification Attack
A. Quantum amplification
Eve makes Gisin and Massar’s UQCM work in L-steps
cascade manner and propagates the imperfect clones to
(q/p)L-photons. Assuming that the density matrix in the
k-step is given by
ρk = akρ+ bkρ⊥, (25)
the coefficients ak and bk obey the following recurrences:
ak+1 = Fak +Dbk, (26)
bk+1 = Dak + Fbk, (27)
from (17). Solving the recurrences, we get the following
final state:
ρfinal =
1
2
(
1 + ηL
)
ρ+
1
2
(
1− ηL) ρ⊥. (28)
The final state is much depolarized and its parity infor-
mation cannot be gained, if L is large enough .
B. Measurement for the auxiliary information
Eve measures Stokes parameters of the (q/p)L-clones
though the states are much depolarized. The expecta-
tion values of Stokes parameters per single photon are
calculated by
〈S1〉 = Tr[S1ρfinal] = ηL cos θ, (29)
〈S2〉 = Tr[S2ρfinal] = ηL sin θ cosφ, (30)
〈S3〉 = Tr[S3ρfinal] = ηL sin θ sinφ, (31)
and their dispersions are given by
∆S21 = 1− η2L cos2 θ, (32)
∆S22 = 1− η2L sin2 θ cos2 φ, (33)
∆S23 = 1− η2L sin2 θ sin2 φ. (34)
The whole Stokes parameters and the whole dispersions
are proportional to the total photon number (q/p)L. The
whole Stokes parameters are obtained by
Stotal1 =
(
q
p
)L
〈S1〉 =
(
q + 2
p+ 2
)L
cos θ, (35)
Stotal2 =
(
q + 2
p+ 2
)L
sin θ cosφ, (36)
Stotal3 =
(
q + 2
p+ 2
)L
sin θ sinφ. (37)
Their S/N ratio is also estimated by
S/N =
(q/p)L〈S∗〉
(q/p)L/2∆S∗
≈
(
q
p
)L
2
ηL =
(
p(q + 2)2
q(p+ 2)2
)L
2
, (38)
and then the S/N ratio grows large if the index satisfies
the inequality
p(q + 2)2
q(p+ 2)2
> 1. (39)
The growing condition is as follows:
q +
4
q
> p+
4
p
, (40)
and its solution becomes
q > 4 at p = 1, or q > p ≥ 2. (41)
Therefore the whole Stokes parameters grow large enough
to be measured accurately if L is sufficiently large and the
4inequality (41) is satisfied. Buzˇek and Hillery’s UQCM
does not satisfy the condition and cannot be used in the
attack[20]. Eve, then, measures the Stokes parameters
and gets the accurate auxiliary information.
We can also estimate statistical S/N ratio although the
S/N ratio by quantum noise has been estimated in the
above argument. The final states are (q/p)L-identical
states obeying binominal distribution
P (k) =NCkFfinal
N−kDfinal
k, (42)
where P (k) is probability distribution function with the
N − k-original state ρ and the k-orthogonal state ρ⊥,
N = (q/p)L, Ffinal = (1+η
L)/2, Dfinal = (1−ηL)/2, and
NCk is binominal coefficient. The mean value of Stokes
parameter is, then, calculated by
〈S1〉statistics =
N∑
k=0
((N − k)− k)P (k) cos θ,
= (1− 2Dfinal)N cos θ,
=
(
q
p
)L
ηL cos θ. (43)
Its variance is given by
〈∆S21〉statistics = 〈S21〉statistics − 〈S1〉2statistics,
= 4FfinalDfinalN cos
2 θ. (44)
Therefore the statistical S/N ratio is obtained by
S/Nstatistics =
ηLN√
4FfinalDfinalN
,
=
ηL√
1− η2L
(
q
p
)L
,
∼
(
p(q + 2)2
q(p+ 2)2
)L
2
. (45)
The result is the same as (38) in the quantum noise.
C. Observation for the parity information
Eve observes the latter (multi-)photon with the auxil-
iary information obtained in step 2 and gets the correct
parity information. The parity information is equivalent
to key information generally and she obtains the correct
key information.
The attack enables Eve to disclose key information be-
fore the auxiliary information is opened by the legitimate
entities and is effective for some protocols with multi-
photon having no public announcement of the auxiliary
information[21].
V. APPLICATION TO Y-00 PROTOCOL
Recently reported Y-00 protocol[15]-[19] is a kind of
quantum key expansion protocol and 1,000-10,000 times
faster than conventional quantum cryptography because
it uses mesoscopic coherent pulse including 100-1,000
photons. The quantum amplification attack seems to be
applicable to Y-00 protocol whose security depends on
quantum noise with two important ingredients: multi-
valued modulation and ciphering wheel.
A. Essence of Y-00 protocol
We roughly sketch the essence of Y-00 protocol with
polarization coding in the following. Y-00 protocol pre-
pares the M -pair states:
|+, k〉=
∣∣∣∣α cos θk2
〉
H
∣∣∣∣α sin θk2
〉
V
, (46)
|−, k〉=
∣∣∣∣α cos θk + π2
〉
H
∣∣∣∣α sin θk + π2
〉
V
, (47)
where k = 0, . . . ,M − 1 and the right-sided ket vector
is coherent state on each basis and |α|2 equals to the
average photon number and θk = πk/M . The two pairing
states have the diametrical relation with each other on
Poincare´ sphere. The sign in the left side corresponds to
the parity information and the multi-valued k in the left
side corresponds to the auxiliary information.
Key information is not the same as the parity informa-
tion in Y-00 protocol. The ciphering wheel maps from
the parity information and the auxiliary information to
the key information in the following:
CW (+, k : even) = 0, (48)
CW (−, k : even) = 1, (49)
CW (+, k : odd) = 1, (50)
CW (−, k : odd) = 0. (51)
Eve without knowing the auxiliary information, thus,
cannot guess the correct key information even though
she knows the correct parity information.
The state |+, k〉 has the following Stokes parameters:
〈S1〉 = |α|2 cos θ, (52)
〈S2〉 = |α|2 sin θ, (53)
〈S3〉 = 0, (54)
and their dispersions are given by
∆S21 = ∆S
2
2 = |α|2. (55)
The neighboring states with the same parity cannot be
discriminated if M is sufficiently large, where the neigh-
boring condition is given by
|~S±,k − ~S±,k′ | < ∆S = |α|. (56)
The condition is equivalent to
∆k <
M
π|α| , (57)
and Y-00 protocol seems to be secure if M > |α|π is
satisfied.
5B. Quantum Amplification Attack to Y-00 protocol
The quantum amplification attack needs no auxiliary
information opened publicly and then seems to be effec-
tive against Y-00 protocol. It uses mesoscopic coherent
pulse instead of single photon state. Eve must extract
some single photon states from the mesoscopic coherent
state in order to let the UQCM work.
She splits the targeted state into two mesoscopic co-
herent state by a beam splitter at first. The one state
|α1 cos θ/2〉H |α1 sin θ/2〉V is used in the quantum ampli-
fication and measurement for the auxiliary information.
The other state |α2 cos θ/2〉H |α2 sin θ/2〉V is used in
measurement for the parity information.
Eve, moreover, splits the first state into J-weak coher-
ent states by beam splitters in a cascade way
[∣∣∣∣ α1√J cos
θ
2
〉
H
∣∣∣∣ α1√J sin
θ
2
〉
V
]⊗J
, (58)
where |α1|2/J ≪ 1.
One of the weak coherent states is equivalent to
|0〉H |0〉V + α√
J
(
cos
θ
2
|1〉H |0〉V + sin θ
2
|0〉H |1〉V
)
+O( |α|
2
J
), (59)
where |0〉, |1〉 are numbering states in each mode. The
first term is a vacuum and the second is single photon
state. Other multiphoton states are negligible.
The single photon state can be represented by
α1√
J
(
cos
θ
2
|H〉+ sin θ
2
|V 〉
)
, (60)
in qubit-like representation. Eve expects to get |α1|2-
identical single photons because she has J-states. The
state, moreover, keeps the auxiliary information θ per-
fectly.
Eve quantum-amplifies the obtained single photon
states and measures them for the accurate auxiliary in-
formation. She obtains the correct parity information
using the auxiliary information finally.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the quantum amplification attack, the UQCM plays
an important role though any UQCM cannot make per-
fect clones. Because the UQCM, which is some kind
of unitary transformation, has invariant subspace in the
space of Stokes parameters R3. Although the fidelity of
an imperfect clone to the original photon decreases below
1, the direction of its Stokes parameters is invariant be-
tween the original and the clone. The space of Stokes pa-
rameters is, then, divided by one-dimensional real space
and two-dimensional projective space,
R
3 ∼ R× P 2, (61)
where the parity information corresponds to the sign of
the one-dimensional real space R and the auxiliary in-
formation corresponds to the two-dimensional projective
space P 2 which is invariant under the transformation by
the UQCM.
The commutation relations (8) among Stokes param-
eters say that the all parameters cannot be observed si-
multaneously and accurately by uncertainty relations. It,
then, seems strange that the attack measures the accu-
rate direction of the Stokes parameters. The accurate
measurement, however, does not contradict the uncer-
tainty relations because the attack gains no parity in-
formation and then two diametrical points on Poincare´
sphere cannot be discriminated. The attack, then,
squeezes any state to extending to the parity real space
and to shrinking in the projective space in Fig. 4. There-
fore the attack may be regarded as some kind of quantum
non-demolition measurement[22].
S1
S2
ρ
⊥ρ 0at =φ
θ
outρ
S1
S2
ρ
⊥ρ 0at =φ
θ
outρ
FIG. 4: Squeezing
The attack is applicable to BB84 protocol with mul-
tiphoton although it does not work in the protocol with
single photon because the protocol carries critical infor-
mation on the parity information. On the other hand,
the attack is also expected to be effective in Y-00 pro-
tocol because the protocol carries critical information on
the auxiliary information rather than the parity informa-
tion.
The attack has, however, some open problems. It is
generally said that no photon-number amplifier can avoid
fluctuation of photon-number and then sufficient large
S/N ratio cannot be gained[20]. The UQCM is, however,
a kind of unitary transformation and the photon-number
is conserved. It, then, seems to be hard for the UQCM
to exist. It is more severe problem that the measurement
of Strokes parameters is executed to the whole clones
and the treatment as the mixed states is somewhat won-
dered since the output state of the UQCM is entangled
state and independent measurement changes the entan-
gled output into the mixed states. The cascade manner
operation of the UQCM is not a severe problem because
the attack is effective at L = 1. Its application to B92
protocol[23] whose critical information is also carried on
the auxiliary information would be challenging because
recent reports[24, 25] have proved its unconditional secu-
rity.
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